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Petruzzo: Employee Involvement Programs and Electromation: Is the TEAM Act

NOTES

EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS
AND ELECTROMATION: IS THE TEAM
ACT THE SOLUTION?
I.

INTRODUCriON

Reacting to the declining position of the United States as the
world's leading economic force, many employers have attempted to
increase employee satisfaction and productivity by involving them
in workplace management.1 Over the past two decades, many
employers have tried to improve the quality of life for their employees by increasing employee participation in management decisions.2
Although late nineteenth and early twentieth century employers
often used company unions3 as union busting devices,4 today many
employers, commentators and scholars believe that giving employ1. See Martin T. Moe, ParticipatoryWorkplace Decisionmakingand the NLRA: Section
8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1127
(1993). Much of the enthusiasm for participatory management stems from corporate
America's sense of impending competition from foreign corporations. Many of America's
foreign competitors, including Germany and Japan, have long employed participatory
management programs. Many Americans now believe that the best way to compete in the
global market is to follow suit and adopt participatory management programs. See also Linda
L. Rippey, Note, Alternatives to the United States System of Labor Relations: A Comparative
Analysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and
Sweden, 41 VAND. L. REv. 627, 627-58 (1988).
2. See Andrew A. Lipsky, ParticipatoryManagement Schemes, the Law, and Workers'
Rights:A ProposedFramework ofAnalysis, 39 Am. U. L. Rlv. 667,672-74 (1990); Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Legal Barriersto Worker Participationin Management Decision Making, 58
TuL L. Rnv. 1301, 1317 (1984).
3. See discussion infra, notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
4. See Lipsky, supra note 2, at 694. In the 1930's, employers conned their employees by
using company unions to give employees the feeling they were actually represented by a
union. See id.
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ees a chance to voice their ideas through employee involvement
6
programs5 ("EIP") increases job satisfaction and productivity.
Despite the increased use of these EIPs, their legality remains
unclear under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act 7
("NLRA"). The failure of the National Labor Relations Board8
("Board") and the federal courts to give a consistent interpretation
to section 8(a)(2) furthers the ambiguity regarding EIPs.9 Recent
rulings by the NLRB and the federal courts raise even further
doubt as to the legality of these EIPs.10 Given the success of an
increasing number of companies using EIPs, this provision of the
NLRA has met increasing opposition." In response to the ambiguity, a proposed bill is pending in Congress which if enacted, would
legalize the use of EIPs by employers.' 2 The Teamwork for
Employees and Management Act ("TEAM") would amend section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA in order to legalize EIPs. 13 TEAM is causing
great debate among Republicans,' 4 Democrats, 5 scholars,16
employers' 7 and unions.' 8 The debate centers around whether the
TEAM Act will bring back the company union or give employees a
5. This term encompasses a broad range of programs which are designed to include
nonmanagement employees in company decision making. Though there are differences
between the models employers choose to implement, as used in this note, the phrase
employee involvement programs symbolizes the general philosophy rather than any specific
type.
6. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition:The Casefor PartialRepeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
125, 126 (1994).
7. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994).
8. The National Labor Relations Board's main responsibilities are to enforce the unfair
labor practice provisions of § 8 and to hold representation elections under § 9 of the NLRA.
9. See Moe, supra note 1, at 1128.
10. Compare Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affd, 35 F.3d 1148
(7th Cir. 1994), Keeler Brass Auto. Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995) and E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993), with Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625
(9th Cir. 1974), Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1967) and
Chicago Rawhide Mfg. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955).
11. See Lipsky, supra note 2, at 669.
12. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995).
13. See id.
14. See Employee Involvement House Members Split Along Party Lines Over Impact of
TEAM Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 92, at D-3 (May 12, 1995).
15. See id.
16. See Moe, supra note 1, at 1178-79.
17. See Lois Servaas, Hoekstra's TEAM ProposalDraws Wary Union Response, Grand
Rapids Bus. J., July 10, 1995 at 1.
18. See id.
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greater say indecision-making that is now unilaterally made by the
employer.
This note will argue that the TEAM Act's amendment to section
8(a)(2) is needed in order to bring the NLRA in tune with today's
work force and work environment. With work environments continually evolving as a result of the accelerating level of sophistication
of the workplace, the globalization of markets and advances in
labor and cost saving technology, section 8(a)(2) is in desperate
need of reform. 19 It is an injustice that the labor act prohibits
employee involvement, because employees can contribute tremendously in the management of the workplace.20 Companies that are
already using EIPs generally see positive results, and so do their
employees 2 Workers feel better about themselves, have a higher
quality of work life and companies see increased productivity?22
Part II of this note will examine the historical background for
banning company unions. Part HI focuses on recent rulings by the
NLRB in federal courts that foster this unilateral style of management. Part IV will examine the proposed TEAM Act and the ensuing debate and illustrate why its passage is essential to the future of
the American workplace.
I1.

LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1935, the drafters of the NLRA forbade employers from
"dominating, or interfering, with the formation or administration of
any labor organization, or contributing financial or other support to
it." 23 Given the bitter strikes that occurred in the early part of this
century, many employers were unsure as to whether they should

crush or help the growth of organized labor.24 In response, many
employers started company unions which gave their employees the
feeling that they were represented by a union, when in truth, the
union that represented them was controlled by the employer.' The
prototypical company union was established and funded by the
19. See generally Raymond L. Hogler, Employee Involvement and Electromation, Inc:
An Analysis and a Proposalfor Statutory Change, 44 LAB. L.. 261 (1993).
20. See Moe, supra note 1, at 1130-35.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1135-37.

23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
24. See Devki K. Virk, Participationwith Representation: Ensuring Workers' Rights in
Cooperative Management, 1994 U. ILt. L. Rlv. 729, 732.
25. See id at 732-35.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:581

employer with membership only extended to company employees.26
Employees would generally elect representatives from the workplace, who served with management on committees which tried to
resolve worker grievances, operational problems, as well as discuss
wages and benefits. 27 While these committees served as a forum for
discussion, final authority over all discussed material rested solely
with the employer. 28
The rapidly increasing number of company unions deeply concerned Senator Robert Wagner, the primary drafter of the
NLRA. 29 According to Senator Wagner, the company union contained an inherent inequality of bargaining power.3" Additionally,
Wagner felt that company unions were an ineffective means for
advancing employees rights.31 From Wagner's point of view, no
legitimate collective bargaining could occur when the employer was
on both sides of the table: "[c]olective bargaining becomes a mockery when the spokesman of the employee is the marionette of the
employer."3 2 With these concerns in mind, congress passed the
NLRA in 1935.A The purpose of the NLRA was in part, to promote the equality of bargaining power between the employer and
the employee.' Wagner believed that company unions, which had
multiplied rapidly in recent years, were the greatest obstacle to the
collective bargaining process.35 From the very outset it was clear
that the NLRA's prohibition of company unions was aimed at terminating this form of sham union, "which gave employees the false
26. See Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance
Of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. Rv. 499, 520-25 (1986).
27. See id. at 523.
28. See id.at 524-25.
29. See Mark Barenberg, The PoliticalEconomy of the Wagner Act: Power,Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HAv.L. REv. 1381, 1386 (1993) ("The role of the company
union was the most important substantive issue in the political fight over the drafting and
passage of the Wagner Act.").
30. See 78 CONG. Rc. S3443 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
31. See Virk, supra note 24, at 736. In most company union arrangements the employer
oversaw the election of employee representatives, provided financial support to the group,
retained veto power over proposals and could extinguish the group at any time. See id.
32. 79 CONcG. RFc. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
33. See Martin T. Moe, ParticipatoryWorkplace Decisionmakingand the NLRA: Section
8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1127,113738 (1993).
34. See id..
35. See 78 Cong. Rec. 3443 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss2/5

4

Petruzzo: Employee Involvement Programs and Electromation: Is the TEAM Act

19971

Employee Involvement Programs

impression that their chosen representatives would collectively bar36
gain on their behalf.
The NLRA's prohibition of company unions involves two separate but distinct portions of the Act. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it."' 37 For a group to fall within
the scope of section 8(a)(2), it must fall within the statutory definition of a "labor organization" under section 2(5) of the NLRA. A
labor organization is
any organization of any kind, or any agent or employee represen-

tation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.38
A.

The Courts' Interpretationof Section 2(5)

The last time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes a labor organization was in 1959. In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon,39 a company established employee committees in its nonunion
plants, after the War Production Board recommended that the company provide a means for resolving conflicts.40 Management collaborated with the employees to write the committees constitution and
by-laws, in addition to defining goals and operating methods of the
committee.41 Employees elected their representatives, who met
monthly with management.4' After maintaining this format for over
a decade, the Chemical Workers Union filed a section 8(a)(2)
unfair labor practice charge against the employer, after the union's
organizing attempts failed at many of the company's plants.43
In finding a section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice, the Supreme
Court adhered to a broad definition of what constitutes a labor
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Moe, supra note 33, at 1138.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
Id
360 U.S. 203 (1959).
See Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 203.
See id at 205.
See id at 206.
See id at 206-07.
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organization.' The Court construed "dealing with" as encompassing more than simply bargaining.45 The Court held that committees
can deal with management within the meaning of section 2(5) simply by making recommendations or requests, even if the committees never attempt to negotiate a formal contract with the
employer.46 The Court dismissed the company's argument that no
real dealing had occurred because the final word on all proposals
rested with itself.47
The NLRB has interpreted Cabot Carbon to bring almost all
EIPs within the reach of section 2(5), unless the EIP includes all of
the company's employees48 or the program constitutes a total delegation of traditional management functions to a group of employees.49 Recently, however, some appellate courts have shied away
from the strict interpretation the Supreme Court gave labor organizations in Cabot Carbon.
In NLRB v. Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 0 the
court rejected a strict interpretation of section 2(5) and concluded
that EIPs are not labor organizations under the NLRA when
employees outwardly express their desire not to be unionized.5 In
Scott & Fetzer, the employer instituted an EIP consisting of both
employees and management.52 The purpose of the EIP was to provide an informal process to pass along company plans as well as
elicit suggestions to deal with improving plant operations. 3 In holding that the EIP was not a labor organization within the meaning of
section'2(5) and, therefore, not susceptible to a section 8(a)(2) challenge, the court distinguished Cabot Carbon.5 4 The Sixth Circuit
noted that the facts of Cabot Carbon "involved a more active, ongo44. See id.at 210-14.

45. Id.at 211-12.
46. See id.at 213-15.
47. See id.at 214.
48. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977).
49. See Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1120-21 (1977).
50. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).

51. See id. at 295. In Scott & Fetzer, the court held that the committees were not
representative because the members rotated regularly and none of the employees considered
the committees to be labor organizations. See id. at 289-95.
52. See id. at 289. The committee was to consist of eight employee representatives with
at 289-90.
management personnel present. See id.
53. See id at 289.
54. See id. at 291-94.
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ing association between management and employees ... ."' Due to
the fact that the EIP had been set up by the employer "to determine employees attitudes regarding working conditions.., for the
Company's self-enlightenment, rather than a method by which to
pursue a course of dealings, 56 the court concluded that the EIP
was merely a communication device.57 The court reached this conclusion by relying heavily on factors which the Supreme Court in
Cabot Carbon glossed over. 8
B.

The Courts' Interpretationof Section 8(a)(2)

Once an EIP is found to be a labor organization, the Board or
court must then decide if the EIP is unlawfully dominated, interfered with or supported by the employer within the meaning of section 8(a)(2).5 9 The section 8(a)(2) standard was first developed by
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co.6" In Newport News, the Court affirmed a Board order
disestablishing an employer assisted EIP that was operating to the
apparent satisfaction of the employees.61 The Board found that the
employer had unlawfully dominated, assisted and interfered with
the administration of the labor organization.62 The Board based its
conclusion on the fact that amendments to the EIP's charter and
the EIP's proposals were subject to approval by the employer.63
The Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the Boards' order, because it
believed that the Board failed to consider the evidence that the
employer's motives in forming the EIP were proper and that the
EIP enjoyed overwhelming employee support.64
55. Id. at 294.
56. Id.
57. See id.
at 295.
58. See id.
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
60. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
61. See Newport News, 308 U.S. at 251. The preamble of the plan stated that its purpose
was to give "employees a voice in respect of the conditions of their labor and to provide a
procedure for the prevention and adjustment of future differences." Id. at 244. The
committee was to consist of five elected representatives and not more than five
representatives chosen by management and management representatives. See id.at 244-45.
62. See idat 247.
63. See id at 245-47.

64. See Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 101 F.2d 841, 846-48 (4th
Cir. 1939).
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In reversing, the Supreme Court ruled that in order to comply
with section 8(a)(2), the EIP must be structurally independent from
management. 65 Reasoning that the purpose of the NLRA was to
provide a framework where employees could be free to organize
without being controlled by management, the Court held that
employees could not truly exercise their statutory rights in an
organization controlled by management.66 The Court also stated
that an EIP could violate section 8(a)(2) even though employees
were satisfied with the plan and the employer established the EIP
with the proper motives in mind. 67 Equally irrelevant was the
degree of employer involvement in the plan and the absence of
coercion.68 Following Newport News, the Board generally treated
section 8(a)(2) as an automatic prohibition of any employer
involvement in an EIPI. 69 As the company union becomes more
increasingly obsolete and newer forms of beneficial EIPs develop,
the rigid application of the Newport News test becomes increasingly
inappropriate, given the Board's mandate to interpret the NLRA in
light of changing industrial conditions.7 °
While the Board has strictly adhered to the traditional rule, a few
appellate courts have developed more flexible standards to accommodate newer forms of EmPs.7 ' These courts have departed from
the Newport News standard and have chosen instead to adopt a free
choice analysis. 72 Under this approach, courts do not consider EIps
to be dominated, assisted or interfered with if the employees freely
choose to have such a program and are satisfied with it.73
65. See Newport News, 308 U.S. at 250-51.
66. See id. at 249.
67. See id at 251.
68. See id at 248-51.
69. See. eg., Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 198 N.L.R.B. 891, 891-92 (1972)
(finding a violation because management acted in an advisory position to the EIP and
assisted it in finding legal representation); Merrill Transport Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1098-99
(1963) (finding a violation because the EIP also had members of management in it, the
employer paid employee representatives for their time and the employer furnished a place
for the EIP to meet).
70. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
71. See generally Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Modem
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1967); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., v.
NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955).
72. See cases cited supra note 71.
73. See cases cited supra note 71.
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In 1955, the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing
Co., v. NLRB 74 stated that one of the Act's purposes is employeremployee cooperation. 75 The court gave consideration to two factors the Newport News Court deemed irrelevant: employee satisfaction with the plan76 and the employer's proper motives. 77 In
Chicago Rawhide, the employees formed an independent shop
committee.78 The employer permitted them to post notices of election on company bulletin boards and to meet on company time.7 9
The Board considered this to be unlawful support under section
8(a)(2) and issued a cease and desist order.80 The Seventh Circuit
refused to enforce the order determining that this was not unlawful
support but rather lawful cooperation.8 ' "Cooperation only assists
the employees... incarrying out their independent intention."'
The court explained that employer motive in establishing an EIP is
an important factor in determining whether unlawful domination
exists.8 3 The court implicitly distinguished Newport News by
explaining that actual domination differs from potential domination, which should not be illegal.' 4 Furthermore in Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 5 the Ninth Circuit upheld an EIP consisting of
professional employees using the free choice rationale.8 6 The court
explained that the employer did not dominate the EIP because the
employees themselves chose to establish the committee.8 7 In fact,
the idea was brought up by an employee and was later approved by
the employees. 8 So, under a free choice analysis, management
involvement in EIPs is not per se illegal if the employees are satis74. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).

75. See id at 167.
at 169.
76. See id,
at 170.
77. See id.
78. See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 727, 730-31 (1953), enforcement
denied, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
79. See iLat 730-31.
80. See idat 736-37.
81. See Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 167.
at 167.
82. ld.
83. See id at 170.
84. See iL
85. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
86. See id. at 631.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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fled with this structure 89 and there is no evidence that employee
preferences are tainted by employer actions. 90
Another example of where a court noted the importance of cooperation and employee free choice in a section 8(a)(2) analysis
occurred in Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB. 91 In Modern Plastics,
the employer provided secretarial services, a conference room and
pay for members of the EIP.92 The Sixth Circuit upheld the legality
of the EIP, once again noting the lack of anti-union feelings on the
part of the employer 93 and employee satisfaction with the program.94 The court concluded that this did not constitute unlawful
domination on the employers part. 95
Ill. Tim

RE-EMERGENCE OF

ElPs

AND ELECTROMA TzON

During the last fifteen years the use of EIPs has reemerged and
gained widespread popularity. 96 These programs have been used in
both union and nonunion companies. 97 The use of EIPs has gained
the support of many in the business and academic arenas. 98 By
allowing workers to get involved in defining the terms and conditions of their employment, these plans have resulted in substantial
gains in productivity 99 and increased employee job satisfaction. 100
Because of changes in the economy and developments in the circuit
courts, many commentators hoped that the Board and then the Seventh Circuit would use Electromation, Inc., v. NLRB 10° to clarify
89. See id. at 631.
90. See id.
91. 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
92. See id. at 202-03.

93. See id, at 204.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Devki K. Virk, Participationwith Representation:Ensuring Workers' Rights in
Cooperative Management, 1994 U. Iu. L. REv. 729, 744. According to some surveys,
approximately 30,000 American employers have established some type of EIP. See Brian S.
Moskal, Is Industry Ready for Adult Relationships?, INDus. WK., Jan. 21, 1991, at 18, 19
(finding that 78% of the businesses responding to the survey considered themselves
"engaged" in EIPs).

97. See iL
98. Se4 eg., Joseph B. Ryan, The Encouragement of Labor-ManagementCooperation:
Improving American Productivity Through Revision of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 40
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 571 (1992).
99. See H.R. 743 § 2(a)(4) (1995); S. 295 § 2(a)(4) (1995).
100. See id.
101. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affd., 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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the standards for evaluating EIPs and would adopt a more flexible
approach allowing the use of some EIPs.102 However, neither the
Board nor the Seventh Circuit adopted more flexible approaches as
expected. In fact, they complicated the matter further.
In Electromation, the Board ruled that labor management
"action committees" designed to deal with the employer on such
matters as employee absenteeism, pay progression and no smoking
policies, were unlawfully dominated labor organizations. °3 Electromation was a nonunionized manufacturer of electrical components
who, due to heavy financial losses, announced in late 1988 that it
would not be increasing wages in 1989 and would discontinue
bonuses for good attendance. 10 4 After the employees expressed displeasure, management met with eight selected employees and concluded that the company had serious morale problems and that a
unilateral style of management would no longer work.105 At a subsequent meeting with the same eight employees, the company introduced its idea of creating five action committees. 6 The committees
consisted of six employees, one or two members of management
and the Employee-Benefits manager. 7 The committees met
weekly in company conference rooms and were paid for their
time. 10 8 In February of 1989, the Teamsters Union demanded recognition from the employer.109 Up until that time, management had
been unaware of any union organizational activity at the plant.110
Management then told the employee members of the committees
that it could no longer participate with them in the groups, but that
they could continue to meet on their own if they wished. 11 After
the Teamsters lost the representative election, they filed
a section
12
8(a)(2) charge with the NLRB against the employer.1
102. See Ryan, supra note 97, at 571.
103. See Electromation,309 N.L.R.B. at 997.
104. See id at 990.
105. See id. at 990-91.
106. See id at 991. The action committees pertained to the following areas: "(1)
Absenteeism/Infractions, (2) No Smoking Policy, (3) Communication Network, (4) Pay
Progression for Premium Positions, and (5) Attendance Bonus Program." Id.
107. See id.
108. See i&
109. See id. at 990-91.
110. See i
111. See id.
112. See i
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The Board held that the action committees were unlawfully dominated labor organizations in violation of section 8(a)(2)." 3 Furthermore, the Board found unlawful support because the
committees operated on company time and in company facilities.1 n
With respect to section 2(5) of the Act, the Board reiterated support for the Supreme Court's broad interpretation in Cabot Carbon. 15 With respect to section 8(a)(2) the Board rejected the
argument that anti-union motive should be required in order to find
a section 8(a)(2) violation. 1 6 Instead the Board emphasized that "a
labor organization which is the creation of management, whose
structure and function are essentially determined by management . . . and whose continued existence depends on the fiat of
management" is unlawfully dominated." 7 The Board also stressed
that the very creation of a EIP is a section 8(a)(2) violation unless
the employees determine the form and substance of the
committee. 18
In enforcing the Boards' order, the Seventh Circuit noted the fact
that many companies in the United States have developed EIPs in
order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the corporate
organization."19 The court also took note that in light of today's
changing industrial environment, section 8(a)(2) may require reconsideration in its application to certain EIPs. 20 However, the Seventh Circuit felt that it was not the proper forum for such a reanalysis and that such re-analysis should be left to Congress. 12 ' In
coming to its decision, the court also reiterated its support for the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2(5) in Cabot Carbon."2
With respect to section 8(a)(2) the court stated that "an interpretation.., which would limit a court's focus to only the employees'
subjective will, or which would require a finding of employee dissatisfaction with the organization, is at odds with the Supreme Court's
holding in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id.at 997.
See id.at 998.
See id.at 995.
See iU. at 996.
Id. at 995.
See id.at 995-96.
See Electromation, Inc., v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1156 (7th Cir. 1994).
See iUt at 1157.
See id.
See id.
at 1159-61.
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Co.")123 While the court confronted its previous decision in Chicago
Rawhide, it went to great lengths to distinguish it from the present
case. 1 4 Although both the Board and the Seventh Circuit stated
that this ruling was limited to the EIPs in the present case,125 the
opinions nonetheless
raise substantial doubt about the legality of
6
any EXP.12

The Board has applied the Electromation rule in several recent
cases. 27 In 1993 the Board applied Electromation in a case involving a unionized plant." 8 In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the
Board held that joint labor management fitness and safety committees were unlawfully dominated labor organizations." 9 Because the
plant was unionized, the Board could have found these committees
to be an attempt at directly dealing with employees over mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, in violation of the duty to bargain
exclusively with the majority representative' 3 0 However, the Board
chose instead to rest its decision upon section 8(a)(2) of the Act.' 3 '
In finding that these committees were unlawfully dominated, the
Board emphasized that the employer had veto power over any proposal, the employer controlled how many employees served on the
committees and each committee had a member of management
who served as a leader or advisor. 3 2 Interestingly, the Board also
clarified what it meant by the term "bilateral mechanism"
it used in
33
Act.1
the
of
2(5)
section
discussing
when
Electromation
[B]ilateral mechanism ordinarily entails a pattern or practice in
which a group of employees, over time makes proposals to management, management responds to these proposals by acceptance
123. Id.at 1167.
124. See id.at 1168-69.
125. See id. at 1157.
126. See Martin T. Moe, ParticipatoryWorkplace Decisionmakingand the NLRA: Section
8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1127,1172
(1993) (stating that Electromation effectively entrenched the traditional interpretation of
sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) and that the decision threatens many employer initiated EIPs).
127. See, eg., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
128. See E.L du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B: at 893.
129. See id.at 895-96.
130. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition:The Case for PartialRepeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
125, 142 (1994).
131. See E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895-96.
132. See iL
133. See iLat 894.
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or rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not required. If
the evidence establishes such a pattern or practice, or that the
group exists for a purpose of following such a pattern or practice,
the element of dealing is present. However, if there are only isolated instances in which the group makes ad hoc proposals to
management followed bya management response of acceptance
134
or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.
In July of 1995, the Board applied Electromation to a grievance
committee in Keeler Brass Automotive Group.'13 5 In Keeler Brass,
the employer started a grievance committee in 1983.136 About eight
years later, the employer decide to terminate the existing grievance
committee setup and start a new one.' 37 When the employer started
the new committee procedure, it implemented some changes.13 8 For
example the membership on the committee was reduced from nine
to five, the authority of the committee to call special meetings without notifying the vice president was removed and a separate complaint committee was eliminated. 139 The Board, in concluding that
the committee was a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5), relied heavily upon Cabot Carbon.140 The Board also
found that the committee was unlawfully dominated by the
employer in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the Act.141 "In this case
as in Electromation, actual domination is established by virtue of
the Respondent's specific acts of recreating the organization, modifying and amending it, and determining its structure and function."' 4 Furthermore, the Board also concluded that the employer
unlawfully supported the committee by paying members for their
time, holding meetings in company conference rooms and providing
secretarial and clerical assistance. 4 3
134. Id at 894.
135. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995).
136. See i.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Id.at 1110.
140. See id. at 1113. The Board concluded that the employee committees, like the
employee committees in Cabot Carbon, existed in part for the purpose of dealing with the
employer concerning grievances. See id.The Board then reversed the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that the committee was not a labor organization within the realm of § 2(5) of
the Act. See id. at 1114.
141. See id. at 1114.
142. Id. at 1114-15.
143. See id. at 1115.
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IV. THE

PROPOSED SOLUTION

(TH

TEAM AcT)

In response to Electromation and other recent cases, 144 many
commentators have called for the reform of section 8(a)(2) of the
Act.14 5 However, commentators are divided as to whether the
reform would be best achieved through judicial revision or legislative revision. 146 The wide variety of approaches taken by the Board
and courts indicates that judicial revision would vary greatly among
the jurisdictions." 7 Instead of leaving the task to the judiciary, Congress should assume responsibility for revising the Act and ensure
consistency in the national labor laws. In response to the outcry
from commentators' 48 and employers,"49 Senator Nancy Kassebaum, a member of the Senate Labor Committee, and Congressman Steve Gunderson, a member of the House Education and
Labor Committee, each proposed legislation to reform section
8(a)(2) of the Act so as to exclude certain types of EIPs.' 50 Senate
Bill 295 would amend section 8(a)(2) by adding to that provision
the following clause:
Providedfurther,That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to
establish, assist, maintain or participate in any organization or
entity of any kind, in which employees participate to address
matters of mutual interest [including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency] and which does not have, claim or seek author144. Se4 e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
145. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition:The Case for PartialRepeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
125, 127 (1994); Raymond L. Hogler, Employee Involvement and Electromation, Inc.: An
Analysis and a Proposalfor Statutory Change, 44 LAB. L.J. 261, 262 (1993); Martin T. Moe,
ParticipatoryWorkplace Decisionmakingand the NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and
the Specter of the'Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1127, 1133 (1993).
146. Compare Charles C. Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly
Unorganized Shop: A Legal Basisfor SanctioningJoint Employer-Employee Committees and
Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 809, 840-42 (1977) (arguing for
judicial revision), with Gregory J. Hare, Employee ParticipationPrograms:A GreatIdea, But
Are They Lawful?, 3 DET. C.L. Rlv. 973, 1017 (1991) (arguing for legislative revision).
147. Compare Hertzka & Knowles v NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), with
Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
148. See Estreicher, supra note 145, at 125; Moe, supra note 145, at 1127.
149. See Joseph B. Ryan, The Encouragement of Labor-Management Cooperation:
Improving American Productivity Through Revision of the National Labor Relations Act, 40
UCLA L. Rnv. 571, 572 (1992).
150. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995).
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ity to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements
under this Act with the employer or to amend existing collective
bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor

organization.' 51
The TEAM Act was passed by Congress,152 but the bill was vetoed
by President Clinton on July 30, 1996.153
These bills, since being introduced, have continued to spark great
debate on whether, if enacted into law, they would be beneficial in
increasing employee satisfaction and production or bring back the
company union. Republicans, lead by Representative Gunderson,
believe the bills, if enacted into law, will encourage and legitimatize
workplace organization.' 54 It is believed that this will lead to an
increase in worker productivity and satisfaction.15 5 Democratic
leaders oppose the bill and fear, if enacted, it would bring back the
company union of old.' 56 Also opposing the bill is David Silberman,
director of the AFL-CIO's task force on labor laws.' 57 He too
believes that the bill, if enacted, would bring back the company
158
union that organized labor has fought for so long to get rid of.
However, these fears are exaggerated and the passage of the
TEAM Act into law is needed in order to bring the NLRA in tune
with today's existing workplace practices that encourage teamwork
and cooperation between management and labor. These criticisms
misstate the purpose of EIPs which, while offering a vehicle
for
151. S. 295, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
152. See Employee Participation:Clinton Vetos Team Act Despite Pleasfrom Businessfor
Passage,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at d-4 (July 31, 1996).
153. The final version presented to President Clinton was the Senate version of the bill.
See id. Senate bill S. 295 was reintroduced on February 10,1997 in the identical form that was
vetoed by President Clinton. See Employee Participation:Senate Panel Hearingfrom Labor,
Business on Passageof TEAM Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at d-15 (Feb. 13, 1997).
154. See 141 CoNG. RiEc. E1922-23 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Gunderson).
155. H.R. 634 § 2(a)(4); S. 295 § 2(a)(4).
156. See Employee Involvement TEAM Act Likely to be Taken up This Year Despite
Busy Schedule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 164, at D-13 (Aug. 24, 1995) (discussing
Democrat's and organized labor's fear that the TEAM Act would turn back the clock to the
days when nonunion employers were permitted to set up company or sham unions in an
attempt to stave off a union organizing drive).
157. See AFL-CIO Official Calls TEAM Act "Solution in Search of a Problem", Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at D-8 (Feb. 9, 1995) (discussing Silberman's objection to the
TEAM Act because it would allow for employer dominated committees, such as the
Electromation committee, to be legal).
158. See id
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employees to have a say in workplace decisions, are not intended as
a substitute for unions but rather, as an aid to both employees and
management. With the shift from a manufacturing based economy
to a service based economy, 159 employer-employee interests are no
longer mutually exclusive. Service sector employees are more willing to participate in organizational policy, personnel decisions and
the setting of professional standards.160 In addition, if TEAM is
enacted, it would still be an unfair labor practice for the employer
to dominate the labor organization. Moreover, if employees in a
nonunion setting are dissatisfied with the EIP in place, they could
always choose to be represented by an independent union. TEAM
allows for cooperation between the employer and the employees
but not domination. Even though the proposed amendment does
not directly state that a proper motive is needed by the employer in
order to implement an EIP,16 1 it is implied. A reading of the
amendment as a whole with the already existing language of section
8(a)(2) and the Act in its entirety, indicates that a proper motive is
needed. Motive could be determined by looking to circumstantial
evidence as it is in other unfair labor practice hearings. For example, the Board or the courts could consider the previous history of
the plant to see if there were anti-union feelings or activities or a
prior record of unfair labor practices as presumptive evidence of an
illicit motive. Most importantly, an illicit motive could be presumed
where an EIP is established too close to an organizing campaign.
Revision of section 8(a)(2) is necessary in order to modernize
American labor law and to empower companies to cope with the
ever changing challenges of the twenty-first century. Currently, section 8(a)(2) fosters, if not requires, a unilateral style of management 62 that is incompatible with today's complex workplace.
Furthermore, more than 80% of the largest employers in the
United States have implemented EIPs. 63 Given the steadily declining rate of union membership to less than 15% of all employed
159. See Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace
Democracy Perspective, 23 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. RFv. 39, 42-44 (1988).
160. See David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective
Bargainingby ProfessionalEmployees?, 99 YALEn L.J. 689, 691 (1990).
161. See H.R. 634 § 3; S.295 § 3.
162. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition:The Case for PartialRepeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
125, 126 (1994).
163. See H.R. 634 § 2(a)(3); S.295 § 2(a)(3).
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wage and salary workers in America as of 1995,164 it is increasingly
difficult to understand why the law continues to require employers
to deprive workers of any say in management decisions. With Electromation decided as it was, 165 most EIPs are in danger of being
found illegal. Representative Gunderson recently referred to EIPs
as "speeders on an interstate highway that have not yet been
caught.' 66 The use of EIPs has had a positive impact on the lives of
employees as well as increasing productivity. 167 In order for the
United States to maintain or even reclaim its position as the world's
leading economic force, the use of EIPs is imperative.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the favorable impact EIPs have had throughout the country, it is time that the NLRA be revised so that their use is clearly
legal. Due to the NLRB's unwillingness to accept the use of EIPs
and the courts varying approaches to deal with them, legislation
must be enacted to accommodate this workplace innovation. The
use of ElPs has consistently led to increases in worker satisfaction,
motivation and productivity. Currently, there is a bill in Congress,
the TEAM Act, which would make the use of EIPs legal. With over
30,000 employers having implemented some sort of EIP, it is time
that the national labor laws accept their use. Section 8(a)(2) of the
Act fosters a unilateral style of management whereby employers
cannot get their employees thoughts, feelings, or input in a manage164. See Union Membership Declines In 1995 To 16.4 Million, A 300,000 Drop, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at D-19 (Mar. 3, 1996).
165. See discussion supra notes 111-23.
166. See AFL-CIO Official Calls TEAM Act "Solution in Search of a problem", Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at D-8 (Apr. 3, 1996).
167. See FRED K. FouLKEs & E. LIVERNASH, HuMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, CASES

AND TEXT 335-47 (2d ed. 1989) (tracing the history of participative management in the
United States); see also Paul D. Staudohar, Labor-ManagementCooperationat NUMMI, 42
LAB. LJ. 57 (1996). Giving an example of the GM-Toyota plant EIP which led to more
motivated and productive employees and a more profitable plant. This particular plant had a
history of labor-management conflict, which led to quality and productivity problems and an
eventual shutdown by GM. See id. During negotiations over the site for the proposed joint
venture, Toyota management proposed hiring new workers so it would not have to deal with
adversarial relationship of the former employees of GM. See id. The UAW, who represented
GM workers, found this plan unacceptable. See id. They succeeded in convincing
management of both companies that the old employees could succeed if they implemented
an EIP. See id. With the implementation of the EIP, the companies saw more motivated and
productive employees and a more profitable plant. See id. In addition, the labor-management
strife that plagued the old GM plant no longer existed. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss2/5

18

19971

Petruzzo: Employee Involvement Programs and Electromation: Is the TEAM Act
Employee Involvement Programs

599

rial decision. This type of managerial style is no longer effective.
With the complexities of today's workplace, management needs
help from its employees in order to run a successful business. Many
believe that their continued development and use is critical to the
future competitiveness of the United States in the world market.
Therefore, the passage of the TEAM Act is imperative.
Ralph A. Petruzzo
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